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Australian urban water utilities face a significant challenge in designing 
appropriate demand management and supply augmentation policies in the 
presence of increasing water scarcity and uncertainty over future dam inflows. 
This paper considers the design of optimal demand management and supply 
augmentation policies for urban water. In particular, scarcity pricing is considered 
as a potential alternative to the predominant demand management policy of water 
restrictions.  
A stochastic dynamic programming model of an urban water market is developed 
based on data from the Australian Capital Territory. The model involves an explicit 
consideration of uncertainty via a probability distribution over dam inflows. Given 
a specification of the demand and supply for urban water, state dependent optimal 
price and investment policies are estimated. The results illustrate how the optimal 
urban water price varies inversely with the prevailing storage level and how the 
optimal timing of investment differs significantly between rain dependent and rain 
independent augmentation options. 
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Introduction 
Recent drought conditions across Australia have significantly depleted urban water 
storages and have resulted in severe water restrictions being implemented in most capital 
cities. While the recent drought has been abnormally severe, current urban water shortages 
are indicative of a broader long term trend of increasing urban water scarcity in Australia. 
This trend has been driven by a gradual long term decline in mean inflows into storages, 
increasing demand driven by population growth and minimal additions to supply capacity.  
Given the increasing scarcity of urban water and the potential for climate change to further 
reduce water availability and increase variability, there is increased pressure on urban 
water utilities to implement efficient demand management policies and to make optimal 
supply augmentation decisions. Currently urban water demand management 
predominantly involves the imposition of water restrictions to ration water during times of 
scarcity. In this paper, scarcity pricing is proposed as an alternative to the use of water 
restrictions. Scarcity pricing of urban water was considered in a recent conference paper 
by Grafton and Kompas (2006). 
One of the main difficulties in designing urban water policy, particularly in Australia, is 
the extreme uncertainty surrounding future rainfall and dam inflows. This paper considers 
the design of optimal demand management and supply augmentation policies under 
uncertainty, by constructing and applying a stochastic dynamic programming model of an 
urban water market. This model is used to demonstrate how a scarcity pricing system 
would operate in theory and to evaluate the basic factors governing the optimal timing of 
supply augmentation investment. ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 08.1 
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Urban water policy 
Urban water is typically provided by a monopoly supplier, while the demand for urban 
water is relatively inelastic. Under these conditions an unregulated profit maximising firm 
may increase prices to achieve monopoly rents, resulting in an inefficient allocation of 
water. To prevent such monopolistic behaviour urban water is, in Australia, typically 
supplied by a government owned and/or operated organisation and is subject to 
substantial government regulation, including price control. In this paper, the role of the 
water utility is characterised as that of a social planner who seeks to maximise social 
welfare, given water availability constraints. Implicitly, it is assumed that the water utility 
is government operated and/or effectively regulated to ensure that it acts in the public 
interest. Issues of privatisation and competition in urban water provision are not 
considered in this paper. 
In its role as a social planner, the water utility has two main policy tools — demand 
management and supply augmentation. Demand management is a term used to encompass 
a range of polices designed to restrict or reduce water use in times of scarcity. Given the 
regulatory control over urban water prices, water utilities must rely on a range of 
alternative policies to ration demand. These policies can include water restrictions, 
awareness campaigns and incentives for improvements in water use efficiency.  
It is useful to draw a distinction between essential and nonessential water consumption. 
Essential water consumption refers to the minium amount of water required to meet basic 
sanitation, drinking, bathing and food preparation needs. For the purposes of this paper, 
essential water is defined as that component of water consumption that is unresponsive to 
changes in price. A minimum level of essential water must be supplied at all times. 
However, it may be optimal policy to ration nonessential water consumption in times of 
scarcity. 
Supply augmentation policy is concerned with the nature and timing of additions to water 
supply infrastructure. In this paper, the focus is specifically on infrastructure that 
generates additional water inflows and storage capacity such as new dams or desalination 
plants.  
Demand management 
It is useful to consider demand management policy over short and long run time frames. 
In the short run, when supply infrastructure is fixed, inflow and demand variability can 
combine to produce substantial reductions in storage levels, which necessitate a rationing 
of demand. Demand management polices (such as water restrictions or pricing) can be 
used to allocate the available supply of water during such periods. In the long run, supply 
infrastructure can be altered and demand management policy and supply augmentation 
policy are simultaneously determined.  
This involves a tradeoff between the consumer surplus associated with nonessential water 
consumption and the costs of supply augmentation. In Australia, urban water utilities 
accept that ‘gold plating’ supply infrastructure (so that all nonessential demand for urban 
water can be met at all times) would be unnecessarily costly. The optimal long run ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 08.1 
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demand management policy (long run mean frequency of restrictions or mean price level) 
will maintain the ideal balance between the benefits of nonessential water consumption 
and the costs of supply augmentation. 
Water restrictions 
Water restrictions are currently the main mode of short run demand management 
employed by Australian water utilities. Water restrictions involve complex rules that 
regulate the outdoor use of urban water. Water restrictions do not impose pure quantity 
based limits on water consumption, rather they involve a combination of complete bans on 
certain water uses and limitations on others.  
The less severe stages of water restrictions rely largely on the imposition of inconvenience 
costs to discourage consumption. For example, restrictions may involve limits on the 
hours of the day or days of the month in which watering can occur and/or bans on the use 
of sprinkler systems. Some households may be willing to work around these restrictions, 
while for others the inconvenience of having to hand water at irregular hours will present 
a major barrier to outside water use. In economic terms, these types of restrictions can be 
represented as a transaction cost imposed on consumers. From a social welfare 
perspective, a tax on water consumption yielding the same reduction in consumption 
would be preferable, since it would involve a transfer of rent to the utility/government 
rather than imposing irrecoverable time and inconvenience costs. A tax or scarcity price 
would, however, result in some distributional changes — for example, it would tend to 
benefit consumers with higher time opportunity costs. 
Water restrictions in their more severe forms involve complete bans on outdoor water 
uses. Where there are heterogeneous preferences for water, prescriptive bans will result in 
an inefficient allocation of resources where water is not necessarily directed to its most 
valued uses. The allocative inefficiency of water restrictions has been noted by many 
economists, including Edwards (2006). Water restrictions further distort market outcomes 
by targeting different water uses to varying degrees, while providing implicit and explicit 
exemptions for other uses. This effectively imposes arbitrary judgments on the social 
desirability of certain water uses that override private valuations (Edwards 2006). For 
example, water restrictions are limited to outdoor residential water use (for reasons of 
enforcement) and do not directly limit inside residential water use and industrial water use.  
In addition to the transaction costs and the allocative efficiency costs, water restrictions 
involve substantial implementation costs, such as the costs of advertising and 
enforcement. Quantifying the various costs associated with water restrictions is a complex 
task and one that is not attempted in this paper. A number of economists, including 
Hensher et al. (2006), Brennan et al. (2007) and Grafton and Ward (2007), have 
attempted to estimate the costs of restrictions, using a variety of techniques.  
Water restrictions have historically been used as a short term demand management tool. 
However, in recent times, restrictions have increasingly been used to achieve long term 
reductions in demand, with some jurisdictions going as far as imposing permanent 
restrictions.  ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 08.1 
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Other demand management measures 
Water utilities also employ a range of other nonprice based polices aimed at reducing the 
long term consumption of urban water, including marketing campaigns and subsidies for 
water saving equipment. Marketing or awareness campaigns typically involve advertising 
across various mediums promoting a water conservation message and providing advice 
on how to improve water use efficiency. These campaigns aim to reduce consumption by 
encouraging water consumers to behave in an altruistic fashion. Marketing campaigns can 
be costly, while their actual impact on water consumption is difficult to measure.  
One of the problems with government subsidies for water saving devices is that they may 
induce overinvestment in products that are of little benefit in some cases. For example, 
most states in Australia offer broad subsidies for rainwater tanks; however, the relative 
effectiveness of rainwater tanks varies significantly across regions and across households 
within regions. Where practicable, an efficient price signal is preferred to subsidy 
measures, which tend to be less efficient.  
Current pricing regime 
In Australia, urban water pricing is regulated by state government based regulatory 
agencies. These agencies make price determinations specifying water charges over time 
frames of three to five years. In the absence of scarcity or capacity constraints, an efficient 
allocation of water can be achieved with a price set to the short run marginal cost (SRMC) 
of supply. The SRMC comprises the marginal pumping and treatment costs associated 
with transferring water from storages to households for consumption. Australian water 
utility price regulators generally advocate some form of long run marginal cost (LRMC) 
pricing. There exists some controversy over the use of LRMC pricing in urban water 
(Sibley 2006).  
Definitions and methods of estimating LRMC differ. The Victorian Essential Services 
Commission (2005) defines LRMC as equal to SRMC plus marginal capital costs. 
Marginal capital costs are a measure of the marginal increase in expected future supply 
augmentation costs associated with an incremental increase in demand. A fixed LRMC 
price does not explicitly consider uncertainty over dam inflows and the potential for short 
run fluctuations in storage levels. As a result, a fixed LRMC price will typically be too 
low during a drought (necessitating the implementation of restrictions) and too high when 
storage levels are full.  
Given the significant capital and fixed operating costs of water utilities, marginal cost 
pricing alone (SRMC or LRMC) would result in substantial underrecovery of costs. 
Australian water utilities impose a two part tariff, combining a consumption based price 
component and a residual fixed access charge designed to recover total costs. Issues of 
revenue and cost recovery are not considered in detail in this paper.  
Inclining block pricing schemes are implemented in most Australian capital cities. Such 
schemes are economically inefficient relative to a single uniform price (Edwards 2006; 
Brennan 2006). In the ACT a three block pricing system applies — in 2007-08 the pricing 
structure involves a price of $0.75 a kilolitre for the first 100 kilolitres, $1.67 for 100–300 
kilolitres and $2.57 for consumption over 300 kilolitres.  ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 08.1 
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Scarcity pricing 
In this paper the scarcity price is defined as the price that maximises the expected net 
present value of social welfare over an appropriate time horizon, given uncertain inflows 
and optimal supply augmentation policy. This scarcity price represents the full opportunity 
cost of urban water — the SRMC plus the marginal cost of forgone storage. Where the 
marginal cost of storage forgone represents a reduction in the reliability of future supply 
and a bringing forward of the expected time of future supply augmentation. This price will 
be state dependent, meaning that it will vary depending on the prevailing conditions. For 
example, a scarcity price would vary inversely with storage levels. Scarcity pricing 
presents a potentially more efficient way of allocating urban water resources relative to 
using restrictions.  
A scarcity price is likely to represent an increase in price relative to a LRMC price in times 
of scarcity. Increases in the price of urban water are often opposed on the grounds of 
equity. However, ABS (2006) statistics show that water and sewerage charges represent a 
relatively small proportion of average weekly household expenditure — around 0.7 per 
cent. The OECD (1999) demonstrated that Australia has relatively affordable water 
charges in comparison with other OECD nations. 
For equity reasons, the provision of essential water at a low cost to all households is a 
desirable outcome. One way to achieve this objective would be to use a two block price 
scheme, where a low constant price would apply to the first block of consumption and a 
variable scarcity price would apply to consumption above this level. A two block price 
scheme would involve some loss of efficiency; however, it would represent a substantial 
improvement over a three block system. Ideally the threshold between the two pricing 
blocks would ensure that all nonessential water demand would be exposed to the scarcity 
price. In practice setting the threshold point would involve a tradeoff between equity and 
efficiency objectives. Efficiency costs could be minimised further if the threshold took 
into account differences across households, such as the number of occupants per 
dwelling. 
With scarcity pricing, it would become necessary to accurately measure household water 
consumption occurring within each billing period, which is currently quarterly. Actew has 
noted that it is currently not possible to read all meters on the same day, consequently 
meter reading cannot occur on the last day of the billing cycle for each household. One 
way to overcome this problem would be to invest in new smart metering technology. The 
ACT Government has recently endorsed a pilot smart metering program (Actew, personal 
communication, 2007).  
Another issue remains how to set these scarcity prices in practice. One way to implement 
a scarcity pricing system could be to adopt a stage framework similar to that used for 
water restrictions, where there are a limited number of scarcity stages with corresponding 
price levels and storage trigger points. This approach is discussed in more detail in the 
results section. 
 ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 08.1 
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Supply augmentation 
Traditionally, growth in Australian water demand has been met by the periodic 
construction of new dams. However, a lack of suitable sites, concern over adverse 
environmental impacts and the potential for climate change to reduce future rainfall have 
all reduced the attractiveness of investment in new dams. Two of the main alternatives to 
new dam construction are water recycling and desalination. Both of these alternatives have 
the capacity to provide a stable source of water insulated from rainfall variability (at least 
partially
1). However, both options involve substantially higher capital and operating costs. 
This paper focuses specifically on the timing of supply augmentation investment under 
uncertainty and not on making comparisons between specific supply projects. Decisions 
between alternative supply augmentation projects should be guided by comprehensive 
cost benefit analyses which take into account financial, social and environmental 
considerations.  
Investment in urban water supply infrastructure is often described as ‘lumpy’, in that it 
involves large, infrequent additions to capacity rather than incremental growth. The 
optimal timing of supply augmentation projects, involves a comparison of the expected net 
benefits of investing now to the expected net benefits of delaying investment. Such 
decisions are complicated by the substantial uncertainty surrounding future demand and 
more importantly future rainfall and inflows.  
Demand management policy and supply augmentation policy are interdependent: a supply 
augmentation project generating additional inflows will improve the reliability of supply 
(reduce the frequency of drought) allowing urban water utilities to reduce the long run 
mean frequency of restrictions (or the mean water price). Supply augmentation will also 
result in a reduction in the probability of a shortfall of essential water. Understandably 
urban water utilities typically maintain supply infrastructure so as to ensure that the 
probability of such a system failure would be near zero.  
The timing of supply augmentation involves trading off the benefits of supply reliability 
with the costs of augmentation: investing earlier will improve reliability but increase 
augmentation costs in present value terms. Industry practice has historically involved the 
targeting of an ‘acceptable level’ of reliability, measured as the expected time that 
households are subject to restrictions. In the past, water utilities have made relatively 
arbitrary judgments on this acceptable level of restrictions and have placed little emphasis 
on consumer preferences (Hensher, Shore and Train 2006)
2. One of the reasons for this is 
that the benefits of increased water supply reliability depend on the community’s 
willingness to pay. Estimating this willingness to pay is difficult without a price 
mechanism that reflects scarcity.  
                                                    
1 Water recycling may have some limited exposure to rainfall variability since waste water is 
supplemented by stormwater inflows and infiltration. Any exposure would depend on the size of the plant 
relative to the regions waste water base flow volume. 
2 In recent years, ACTEW has incorporated estimates of willingness to pay derived from stated choice 
experiments (Hensher et al. 2006). ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 08.1 
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While not the focus of this paper, another option for sourcing urban water is to acquire it 
through trade with rural water holders. This is dependent on the existence of a physical 
connection between rural and urban water systems, which in some cities would require 
significant investment in pipeline and pumping infrastructure. CSIRO and CoPS (2006) 
demonstrated the potential economic gains of urban–rural water trade in Australia using 
general equilibrium modelling. The potential for urban–rural water trade using options 
contracts has been examined by Page and Hafi (2007). 
Environmental flows 
An additional aspect of urban water policy not considered in detail in this paper is that of 
environmental flows. Environmental flows are releases from storages back into streams, 
with the aim of maintaining the ecology of the local river system. The ACT Government 
(2006) maintains guidelines that outline specific minimum environmental flow 
requirements from each ACT water storage. Provisions are made that permit the reduction 
of environmental flows during droughts when urban water supplies are threatened.  
There exists a clear tradeoff between releasing water to meet environmental objectives and 
maintaining storage levels to secure urban water supply. In times of drought, water has a 
substantial scarcity value that may exceed the benefits of environmental flows. 
Environmental flows in rural water systems have been the subject of previous ABARE 
research (Beare et al 2006; Heaney and Hafi 2005). 
An urban water model 
This section provides a brief discussion of an economic model of urban water supply and 
demand. The model is a single sector, single region model of the water market in an urban 
centre. The model is formulated as a stochastic dynamic optimisation problem that 
estimates socially optimal price and investment policy functions. 
Dynamic programming techniques are commonly applied in the economics literature to 
consider the optimal extraction paths of scarce natural resources, such as oil, fish or 
forests. Dynamic programming techniques have been applied to a range of water related 
problems, including estimating optimal extractions from groundwater aquifers (Hafi 
2002) and estimating optimal release rules from irrigation storages (Brennan 2007). 
Previous dynamic programming models of urban water pricing and investment include 
the work of Hirshleifer et al. (1960) and Riordan (1971a,b), although these earlier 
models focused on capacity constraints rather than water scarcity as the driver of supply 
augmentation. Stochastic dynamic programming techniques are often used in engineering 
literature to estimate the optimal release rules for reservoirs given uncertain inflows. The 
engineering literature typically has a stronger focus on supply side issues than on issues 
of demand and pricing — see, for example, Perera and Codner (1996).  
The model is based on the ACT region and incorporates data on the demand and supply 
of urban water in the region, provided by the Actew Corporation. While an attempt has 
been made to incorporate a degree of realism, the model remains a significant 
simplification of reality. In particular, a number of simplifying assumptions are made on 
the supply side of the model, in order to keep the level of hydrological and engineering ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 08.1 
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detail to a minimum. The UWM is not a forecasting model and does not attempt to predict 
or estimate the likely impact of a change in urban water policy in the ACT. For example, 
the model is not designed to compare social welfare under a system of restrictions with 
that under a system of scarcity pricing. Rather, the model has been constructed to 
demonstrate a number of general economic concepts related to urban water pricing and 
investment decisions in the presence of uncertainty.  
The model comprises two main components, one specifying the evolution of water 
demand and the other specifying water supply. 
Demand for urban water 
The demand side of the model makes use of urban water consumption data for the ACT 
(Figure 1). 











Econometric studies have used a range of variables to explain observed variation in urban 
water demand over time and across households. Common explanatory variables include 
population, income levels, water use efficiency, housing characteristics, water prices and 
weather conditions, such as temperature and evaporation (Dalhuisen et al. 2003; Hoffman, 
Worthington and Higgs 2006).  For the purposes of this model, a simple aggregate 
demand function is constructed, which accounts for long term growth in urban water 
consumption, seasonal variation, response to weather variability (equation 1) and 
response to price changes (equation 2).  
 
The seasonal variation of demand and the response to weather variability are estimated 
econometrically. A simple explanatory equation for urban water consumption was 
estimated based on quarterly ACT data over period 1960–2000, with explanatory 
variables including seasonal indicators, a time trend, total inflows and two intervention 
terms. The intervention terms account for two structural breaks in the data: lower levels of 
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prevailing weather conditions (such as rainfall and temperature) since this allows the 
model to have a single source of uncertainty.  
Table 1: Demand regression results  
Dependent variable:   Log of total water consumption (ML) 
Explanatory variables  Estimate  Standard error 
 Constant  7.716  0.086 
 Summer  0.397  0.037 
 Autumn  –0.0332  0.037 
 Winter  –0.371  0.035 
 Inflow (ML)  –2.156E-06  2.85E-07 
 Time trend  0.332  0.025 
 1973 intervention term  0.464  0.047 
 1992 intervention term  –0.184  0.037 
     
Standard Error  0.0248   
Adjusted R Squared  0.91  
 
In the model, demand is projected over an arbitrary 25 year time horizon, notionally the 
period 2000–25. The long term growth in demand over time adheres to a logistic 
functional form. The long run growth projection should be considered to be an illustrative 
scenario rather than a forecast. The modelled growth rate is, however, broadly in line with 
the ‘high growth’ scenarios developed in Actew (2004). Equation 1 specifies the 
evolution of demand for water over time given a fixed short run marginal cost price.  
(1)   
Where: 
MC
t Q   = quantity demanded (ML) when price is equal to marginal cost  
INt   = level of inflows at time t (ML)  
b
con
   = estimated demand equation constant 
seas
s b   = estimated seasonality parameters 
b
in   = estimated inflow coefficient 
g1, g2    = long term growth parameters  
t   = time periods (quarters)  
s   = seasons (summer, autumn, winter, spring). 
The price elasticity of urban water demand has been the focus of a major volume of 
economic literature. Dalhuisen et al. (2003) present a comprehensive meta analysis of 64 
US econometric studies, estimating a mean price elasticity of –0.41. Hoffman et. al. 
(2006) conducted a panel data study of urban water demand in Brisbane, estimating a 
contemporaneous price elasticity of between –0.67 and –0.55. A panel data study by 
Xayavong et. al. (2008) in Perth estimated an indoor elasticity of between –0.70 and   
–0.94, and an outdoor elasticity of between –1.30 and –1.45. A study by Graham and 
Scot (1997) estimated the price elasticity of residential water demand in the ACT region to 
be in the range of –0.15 to –0.39.  
A constant elasticity relationship is assumed to exist between urban water demand and 
price, set to a value of –0.45 based on a search of the literature. For each consumer, it is 
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assumed there exists a certain proportion of urban water consumption that is essential and 
hence unresponsive to price. The level of essential water demand is assumed to be 
nonseasonal and is calculated in the model as a fixed proportion of winter equivalent 
aggregate water demand. 
Equation 2 specifies the inverse demand function that defines the relationship between 
price and aggregate water consumption. 
(2)     ()
a a a - = t
MC
t t Q mc Q P
/ 1  
Where: 
t Q   = final quantity of water demanded (ML)  
mc   = short run marginal cost ($/ML)  
1/￿   = assumed demand elasticity. 
Supply of urban water 
For the supply side of the model it is assumed that there is a single initial storage, with 
stochastic inflows. No attempt has been made to incorporate multiple connected storages, 
distribution networks or water treatment services. The ACT at present maintains three 
major water storages. A single storage model can be interpreted as an aggregation of a 
multiple reservoir system. Perera and Codner (1988) demonstrate the use of an 
aggregation approach as a way of limiting complexity and avoiding the curse of 
dimensionality problem inherent in stochastic dynamic programming models.  
Seasonal inflow probability distributions were estimated using historical inflow data for 
the ACT. When estimating inflow distributions, the sample was limited to the period 
1980–2006 in an attempt to represent the lower mean inflows occurring in recent decades. 
Log normal distributions were fitted using maximum likelihood estimators and the 
estimated parameters are shown in Table 2. ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 08.1 
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Table 2: Log normal inflow distribution parameters  
 E(IN)  ￿  ￿ 
Summer  27 138  9.81  0.89 
Autumn  24 158  9.51  1.08 
Winter  47 543  10.48  0.77 
Spring  45 752  10.61  0.49 
 
The supply side of the model also accounts for evaporation from storages and 
environmental flows. In the interests of simplicity it is assumed that evaporation from 
storages adheres to a simple seasonal average and that environmental flows are a fixed 
proportion of total inflows, both based on historical data. The water storage level evolves 




St     = storage level  
TotInt    = total inflows (dependent on supply augmentation) 
Et   = total storage losses (dependent on supply augmentation) 
Kt   = total storage capacity (dependent on supply augmentation) 
SMIN     = storage minimum feasible level. 
The model allows for two forms of supply augmentation investment — rain dependent 
and rain independent. Rain independent augmentation is assumed to generate a fixed 
increase in inflows and no increase in storage capacity. Rain independent augmentation is 
meant to broadly represent either desalination or water recycling. Rain dependent 
augmentation represents construction of dams and is assumed to generate additional 
storage capacity and additional stochastic inflows. For simplicity it is assumed that new 
dam inflows are perfectly correlated with existing inflows. Equations 4 and 5 specify the 
relationship between inflows, storage capacity and supply augmentation investment. 
(4)     
(5)     
Where: 
It,i   = 1 for all t > T where T is the time of execution for investment i 
ef  = the proportion of inflows released to the environment 
nrini  = fixed non rain dependent inflows of investment i (ML) 
￿i  = proportional increase in rain dependent inflow for investment i  
iki  = additional storage capacity of investment i (ML) 
LTi  = lead time (construction period) of investment i (quarters). 
,
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Each option also has a capital expenditure cost, an annual running cost and a lead time or 
construction period. The capital cost is spread equally over the construction period, while 
the ongoing running costs are incurred every season following the construction period. It 
is assumed that each augmentation option is operated permanently at full capacity such 
that inflows are always generated and costs always incurred. It is assumed that the SRMC 
of water supply is constant over time and is independent of the level of water 
consumption and the level of supply augmentation. A value of $1 per kilolitre (kL) is 
assumed for the SRMC.  
Solving the model 
The objective function of the model is the expected discounted sum of market surplus less 
the cost of any new investment and less a penalty imposed for an inability to meet 







MSt  = market surplus (consumer and producer)  
  = level of essential water demand at time t 
TCt   = total cost (capital and/or ongoing costs) of augmentation 
investment at time t  
PENALTYt =  penalty imposed in the event essential water is unable to be met 
￿  = discount factor.  
 
The costs associated with a failure to supply essential water are difficult to estimate in 
practice and may include costs imposed on consumers as well as the costs of 
implementing contingency water supply options. The approach taken in this study is to set 
a penalty term in the objective function to a sufficiently high level to ensure the probability 
of a shortage of essential water is near zero. This would be consistent with the behaviour 
of water utilities that appear unwilling to accept any significant probability of such an 
event.  
 
The model is formulated as a discrete time, finite time horizon, stochastic dynamic 
programming problem. The problem has two state variables, the storage level and the level 
of supply infrastructure (owing to previous supply augmentation), and two policy or 
control variables, price and supply augmentation investment. The problem is specified in 
the standard Bellman (1957) equation form with the continuos variables evaluated over a 
discrete grid. Given the discrete state and policy space and the finite time horizon the 
model can be solved using backwards induction. The model is evaluated over a length of 
time greater than the 25 year simulation period to estimate a terminal value — the value 
function at the end of the last time period. 
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Results 
Two scenarios are constructed — a rain dependent augmentation scenario and a rain 
independent scenario. This approach was necessary because of the so-called ‘curse of 
dimensionality’, which meant that the inclusion of multiple investment projects would 
make the problem unfeasibly large. These scenarios are intended to be illustrative and not 
meant to represent accurate forecasts of specific ACT circumstances.  
It is worth noting that scenarios involving a single augmentation option will tend to 
overstate the extent of water scarcity relative to the case of multiple investment projects, 
since an additional investment project provides an option value benefit that is realised even 
if the project is not executed within the relevant time frame. For example, a water utility 
may adopt a more relaxed pricing policy if, following construction of a dam, it maintains 
an option to construct a desalination plant in the event it is required.  
Rain dependent scenario 
This scenario assumes an augmentation project representative of a new dam as defined by 
the following parameters.  
Table 3: Rain dependent augmentation option parameters 
Capital cost, c  $100 million  
Ongoing cost, a   $1.5 million a year 
Increase in mean inflow, ￿ 0.20 
Additional storage capacity, ik  70 000 ML 
Lead time, LT 2  years 
 
The model estimates the price and investment policy functions that specify the optimal 
policy action as a function of the prevailing conditions For example, the price policy 
function specifies the optimal price given the time period, the prevailing storage level and 
the state of supply augmentation (that is, no augmentation, in progress, or online). Figure 
2 and 3 show the estimated price policy function. As expected, the price policy function 
demonstrates a clear inverse relationship between price and storage level.  
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As the storage level approaches 100 per cent, price approaches, but does not necessarily 
reach, the SRMC. The optimal price is seasonal, being higher in summer and lower in 
winter. At low storage levels, price increases sharply to the maximum price level. The 
maximum price is that where nonessential demand is reduced to zero — this maximum 
price is dependent on the season, being highest in summer and lowest in winter. In reality 
it may not be practical to use scarcity pricing in emergency situations where it is necessary 
to reduce consumption to essential levels. As such these maximum prices should be 
interpreted more as shadow prices, representative of high level water restrictions. The 
estimated optimal price is, for a given storage level and augmentation status, increasing in 
time as a result of demand growth. The optimal price is, for a given time and storage level, 
lower after the completion of an augmentation project (see figure 5). Before augmentation, 
the price policy function is defined over the initial storage state space 10 000 – 200 000 
megalitres, while after augmentation the price policy function is defined over the new 
storage state space (10 000 – 270 000 megalitres). 












Figure 4 shows the estimated investment policy rule as a function of time and the 
prevailing storage level.  
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For each point in time the investment rule defines a storage trigger poin — for storage 
levels below this point, the investment is executed. Over time the storage trigger point 
increases due to demand growth. The investment rule also displays strong seasonality. 
The storage trigger point peaks in winter where the project (new dam) comes online in 
time for the winter high rainfall season in two years time. This result is dependent on the 
assumption of a fixed (two year) lead time, known with certainty. The investment storage 
trigger point reaches 100 per cent by winter 2009, rendering the remainder of the 
investment policy rule trivial.  
 
Given the estimated policy functions model simulations can be generated by drawing a 
series of inflow observations from the defined probability distributions. A Monte Carlo 
analysis can be performed by generating a large number of such simulations and 
combining the results. Figure 5 displays a single example simulation and the increase in 
storage capacity represents the supply augmentation project (new dam) coming online. 









The simulated timing of investment varies depending on the realised conditions (the 
stochastically generated inflows), with a mean execution time of 8.1 years. The variability 
of investment timing for rain dependent augmentation is relatively low compared with that 
of rain independent augmentation (Figure 9). Figure 6 displays the mean price level and 
90 per cent confidence interval estimated by Monte Carlo analysis. The mean price level 
increases over time due to demand growth. The growth in the mean price level slows 
around the time of supply augmentation, before continual demand growth eventually 
drives it up. Figure 6 also displays how the variability in price increases with the mean 
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Rain independent scenario 
The rain independent scenario assumes a rain independent augmentation project as defined 
by the following parameters. 
Table 4: Rain independent augmentation option 
Capital cost, c $200  million 
Ongoing cost, a   $10 million a year 
Additional inflow, nrin   6 000 ML a season 
Additional storage Capacity, ik 0 
Lead time, LT 2  years 
 
In the ACT, water recycling is the most practical form of rain independent supply given 
the distance to the coast. However, it is intended that this scenario be representative of rain 
independent augmentation generally, whether that be recycling or desalination. Within the 
model, desalination and recycling can be considered equivalents in that they both involve 
high capital and operating costs and provide a fixed supply of water.  
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The estimated price policy functions for the rain independent scenario, given the initial 
supply capacity (for example, prior to augmentation) are essentially identical to those 
estimated for the rain dependent scenario. However, after augmentation the estimated 
optimal prices are significantly lower in the rain independent scenario (Figure 7). 
The estimated investment policy function is shown in Figure 8. The storage trigger points 
remain lower, peaking at around 60 per cent at the end of the simulation period (2025). 
With rain independent augmentation, the investment policy essentially involves delaying 
investment where possible until storage levels decline substantially. There are two reasons 
for this. First, rain independent augmentation is more expensive and therefore there is 
more to be gained by delaying its introduction. Second, rain independent augmentation 
provides additional inflows with certainty. This certainty allows the water utility to delay 
investment until storage levels are low, in the knowledge the augmentation project will 
provide inflows sufficient to improve storage levels and ensure that the essential water 
supply is maintained. With rain dependent augmentation, additional storage capacity is 
provided with certainty, but inflows remain highly uncertain.  








The rain independent augmentation investment rule also displays a degree of seasonality. 
With rain independent augmentation the storage trigger point peaks in summer, where the 
project will come on line in time for the critical summer period in exactly two years time. 
Figure 9 displays the cumulative probability distribution over investment timing for rain 
dependent and rain independent augmentation, generated via Monte Carlo analysis. Rain 
dependent augmentation occurs earlier on average (8.1 years compared with 16.7 years) 
and is less variable. The timing of rain independent augmentation is highly variable, being 
strongly dependent on realised inflow levels. For example, there remains a positive 
probability (0.05) that a series of inflows is realised that allows the rain independent 
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The results of this analysis are, in a number of respects, consistent with the recent policy 
responses of urban water utilities in Australia. The severity of the recent drought has led 
most major water utilities to pursue the introduction of rain independent supply. However, 
the introduction of rain independent supply has, in most cases, been delayed wherever 
possible, with water utilities first making use of a range of demand management polices. 
The results also demonstrate the importance of maintaining a flexible approach to supply 
augmentation policy in order to manage risk. Water utilities can, for example, invest in 
lead time reduction, adopt smaller upgradeable investment projects (where the risk savings 
outweigh the economies of scale) and develop temporary supply options such as water 
trade with rural water holders. Such options improve the ability of water utilities to 
respond to reductions in storage levels and facilitate the delaying of investment in costly 
rain independent supply augmentation.  
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Figure 10 displays the mean price for the rain independent scenario. In this scenario mean 
price rises quickly at first given that augmentation occurs on average later than in the rain 
dependent scenario. The mean price falls gradually after year 17, given that augmentation 
is more likely to have occurred. 
‘Staged’ scarcity pricing  
Scarcity pricing could potentially be implemented using a system of stages similar to that 
used for water restrictions. A number of price stages could be defined, each of which 
corresponds to a different level of scarcity. As with restrictions, each stage would aim to 
achieve a specific reduction in water consumption and have an associated trigger point. In 
theory the water utility could simply replace each stage of restrictions with an equivalent 
scarcity price, which they estimate will achieve an equivalent reduction in consumption.  
A staged scarcity pricing system can be represented in the model by limiting the number 
of points within the discrete price policy grid. The model results above are based on a 50 
point price grid. To estimate the impact of a staged price system the model was run 
separately for price grids containing 12 and 6 points the results of these simulations are 
displayed below. The reader might be tempted to interpret these limited price point 
simulations as an implicit representation of water restrictions; however, such an 
interpretation has not been intended and would be an oversimplification of current water 
restriction systems. A reduction in the number of price points yields a reduction in 
welfare. However, the results demonstrate that this loss of welfare is relatively small.  
Table 5: Limited price grid summary results 
   Price grid size 
   50  12  6 
Objective value  $ million  1 335  1 333  1 328 
Change %    –0.2%  –0.5% 
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In the model the water utility is assumed to have full information. In reality, the water 
utility will not have full information on the exact distribution of future inflows, the long 
run growth rate of demand and the elasticity of the demand curve for water. This 
information problem means that, in practice, setting optimal prices would be a nontrivial 
task. It is important to realise, however, that this information problem is not necessarily 
more burdensome than that faced under a system of water restrictions. Water utilities in 
theory require the same information to optimally set water restriction quantity targets and 
storage trigger levels. Further the use of scarcity pricing may over time reveal more 
information, particularly on consumers’ willingness to pay.  
One way to approach the problem of setting prices is to recast it in terms of optimal 
quantities. Water utilities are quite experienced in determining the optimal quantity of 
water consumption given available information on demand and supply. Determining a 
price that achieves this quantity is not necessarily a more difficult problem than 
developing a list of restrictions that achieves the same result. One of the additional 
advantages of scarcity pricing is that there exists more flexibility over the number of 
scarcity stages chosen. With water restrictions, defining distinct stages of varying severity 
is difficult given that each stage involves numerous rules referring to different water use 
activities.  
A scarcity pricing system implemented in the fashion described need not result in highly 
volatile water prices since price changes would occur no more frequently than do changes 
in restriction stages at present. The adoption of such a pricing system would not increase 
the aggregate uncertainty faced by urban water consumers, it would merely replace 
existing restriction uncertainty with price uncertainty. 
Conclusion 
In this paper the role of the urban water utilities is characterised as that of a social planner, 
setting demand management and supply augmentation policies to maximise social welfare. 
In Australia the predominant approach to demand management is the imposition of water 
restrictions. Water restrictions are a relatively limited and inefficient method of rationing 
demand, imposing inconvenience costs, allocative efficiency costs as well as involving 
significant enforcement costs. In this paper, scarcity pricing is proposed as a potentially 
more efficient demand management tool.  
Scarcity pricing would involve the water utility adopting a variable price that responded to 
changes in the level of water scarcity, where for example price would vary inversely with 
the storage level. Scarcity pricing could be implemented under a two block price scheme 
such that essential water consumption remained affordable at all times. 
A stochastic dynamic optimisation model of an urban water market was constructed using 
data on urban water supply and demand in the ACT. The model estimates the optimal 
price and investment policy functions under conditions of uncertainty, given a theoretical 
probability distribution over future dam inflows. The model results demonstrated how a 
scarcity pricing system would operate, with the optimal price inversely related to storage 
levels, increasing in time with demand growth and decreasing with the introduction of 
supply augmentation. The model was also used to demonstrate how a scarcity pricing ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 08.1 
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system could be implemented under a system of price stages similar to the current system 
of water restrictions.  
The nature of optimal investment policy, involving the execution of investments once 
storage levels decline below specific storage trigger points, was also demonstrated by the 
model. Substantial differences were observed between the optimal investment rules of rain 
dependent and rain independent augmentation options. The higher costs and the certain 
inflows associated with rain independent augmentation mean that water utilities are more 
likely to adopt an opportunistic approach: where investment is delayed until substantial 
decline in storage levels occurs. 
Continual demand growth, increasing supply augmentation costs and potential climate 
change impacts are driving a long term trend toward increased urban water scarcity in 
Australia. Urban water utilities will have to rely on more stringent demand management, 
such as more frequent imposition of restrictions or higher prices, and/or substantial 
investment in costly rain independent supply options. Given this reality, policy makers 
should be considering ways of improving the efficiency of demand management and 
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